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I. INTRODUCTION
Endemic in American society is the reflexive behavior of filing a
lawsuit based upon one's perceived notion of having been victimized.
This litigious propensity has resulted in overloaded court dockets at both
the state and federal levels.' Though the Constitution grants all citizens
the right to seek redress from a neutral judiciary,2 discretion should be
exercised to ensure that this designated right is not abused. The judici-
ary and other officers of the court have a corresponding duty to ensure
1. See Guy James Mangano, Law Day '92: The Struggle for Justice, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1992,
at S-1; Thomas B. Marvell, There Is a Litigation Explosion, NAT'L L.J., May 19, 1986, at 13.
2. See George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REv. 3. 9-12 (1989).
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that the system is being properly implemented to promote justice and
fairness to everyone.
The problem created seems to stem from the Constitution itself,
which simultaneously grants rights while imposing duties thereon. Fre-
quently, these rights and duties clash, requiring courts to balance these
opposing forces to determine which party's interest outweighs its oppo-
nent's, and ultimately decide whose rights should prevail. Faced with
this dilemma, courts have understandably reached inconsistent results.
These inconsistencies lead not only to further litigation, but also to con-
fusing and precarious precedents.
Illustrative of this dilemma is a modern wave of First Amendment
suits which seem to have reached epidemic proportions. These suits,
called SLAPPs, an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Par-
ticipation, have proliferated throughout the United States, and have since
spilled across its borders to other parts of the globe.3 The suits pit an
individual's right to petition the government for redress against one's
rightful access to seek a remedy in court. These suits are the focus of
this Comment.
This Comment provides an analysis of the anti-SLAPP statutes that
have been enacted. To the extent available, this comparative analysis
incorporates the legislative history and debates surrounding the contro-
versial topic and the considerations of the committees that proposed the
statutes.4 This Comment also addresses the feasibility of enacting a uni-
form anti-SLAPP statute with procedural safeguards to protect a party's
First Amendment right of free speech and the right to petition govern-
ment, as well as the counter-protection of a party's right of free access to
courts, a recurring conflict in these types of cases. In this regard, a cur-
sory review of the current state of the law concerning defamation and
other tortious acts that are often alleged in these suits will be provided,
as well as a discussion of the applicable standards of proof. Questions
arise as to how these standards of proof can be maintained in light of the
more stringent standards which burden a plaintiff in actions labeled as
SLAPPs. Finally, this Comment introduces a sampling of cases that
demonstrate how anti-SLAPP statutes are currently abused and identifies
potential areas of abuse.
3. See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, World Is Getting SLAPP-Happy, NAT'L L.J.,
May 20, 1996, at A19.
4. Many states do not record or otherwise memorialize the testimony of the persons
contributing to the debates. Therefore, it was necessary to rely on materials published




Submitted for your approval: A concerned citizen, interested in
procuring a safe and healthy community, participates in meetings with a
municipal environmental department regarding groundwater contamina-
tion allegedly caused by a landfill. These meetings include discussions
of the department's rules and regulations concerning landfills. Subse-
quently, this concerned citizen writes to the department's director and
other interested state and federal officials. These letters memorialize the
proceedings, including contamination studies and the landfill owner's
resistance to monitor the contaminant levels to safeguard the commu-
nity, and further express gratitude for the department's recognition and
consideration of the problem. Riled by these letters, the landfill owner
gives the author three options: Provide specific facts and documents in
support of the allegations in the letters; formally retract the letters; or
brace for formal legal recourse. When no retraction is forthcoming, the
citizen is sued. You have now begun your journey into the SLAPP
zone.
The situation described above5 is common among SLAPP suits.
George Pring and Penelope Canan, professors of law and sociology,
respectively, at the University of Denver, have studied the SLAPP phe-
nomenon extensively over a ten-year period.6 They characterize a typi-
cal SLAPP as a civil lawsuit filed against private individuals or
organizations who have spoken out on substantive issues of public inter-
est or social significance.7 The underlying strategy for these suits is
retaliation, aimed at intimidating an individual from engaging in particu-
lar behavior believed to be detrimental to the SLAPP filer.' The suits
tend to have a chilling effect on public participation in governmental
decision making.
The majority of SLAPP filers are seeking to protect their own
vested economic or property interests. 9 Ironically, targets of the suits
are usually individuals or groups who are also seeking to protect their
5. See Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996).
6. See GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT
2 (1996).
7. See supra note 2, at 7-8.
8. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 6, at 8. Professors Pring and Canan have found that use
of the terms "filers" and "targets," to denote the initiators and objects of the SLAPPs, respectively,
is less confusing than use of the terms "plaintiffs" and "defendants," since the actions can be
initiated in counterclaims or crossclaims, reversing the customary labels and typical party
designations (i.e., the plaintiff may be the target defending or the filer prosecuting a SLAPP
action). See id. at 9-10.
9. See George Pring & Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: An Overview of the Practice, in SLAPPs:
STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT, C935 ALI-ABA 1, *12
(1994).
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own economic, property, or family interests. Some targets, however, are
motivated by a desire to achieve self-gain or revenge, or by other ques-
tionable, self-serving goals. 10
Trademark legal claims of SLAPPs include suits for defamation,
tortious interference with business relationships, abuse of process, con-
spiracy, civil rights violations, and other violations of law such as nui-
sance." As these causes of action tend not to arise from federal law,
most of the suits are brought in state courts. 12 The pattern seems to be
the invocation of a claim that the target is infringing on the filer's right
to contract freely, and depends, to a great extent, on rights guaranteed
under the U.S. Constitution.
13
B. An Historic Perspective
The First Amendment provides "the right of the people ... to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances." 4 When written, the
clause was intended to correct evils experienced by the framers of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights that had been imposed by an overly
authoritative sovereign.' 5
While professors Pring and Canan have traced the roots of the
premise on which SLAPPs rely back over a thousand years, the earliest
reported American SLAPP appears in an 1802 Vermont case, Harris v.
Huntington.6 In Harris, the targets were five citizens of Shaftsbury,
Vermont, who opposed the reappointment of Ebenezer Harris as Justice
of the Peace for Bennington County. Harris accused these citizens of
"devising, writing, and publishing... false, scandalous, malicious, and
defamatory libel," calling Harris a "breaker of the peace, a quarreling,
fighting, and sabbath-breaking member of society.., possessing a cor-
rupt and wicked heart." 7 Harris alleged that these scandalous writings
were designed to prevent his re-election by the Vermont Legislature,
ruin his reputation, and lead to criminal prosecution. He sought dam-
ages in the amount of $5000.18 When the jury returned a verdict for
Harris in the amount of one dollar, the defendants moved for an order
for Harris to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside, claim-
10. See id. at *11.
11. See id. at *12.
12. See id.
13. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 6, at 220.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. See THOMAS E. PATrMRSON, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 53-54 (1990); see also New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964).
16. 2 Tyl. 129 (Vt. 1802).
17. Id. at 129-30.
18. See id. at 132.
[Vol. 52:587
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ing that the truth of the statements was exculpatory.' 9
In finding that Harris' suit warranted dismissal, the court noted that
the allegedly libelous petition was presented to the General Assembly,
not dispersed to the general public, and was therefore privileged.2" In
the words of the court:
An absolute and unqualified indemnity from all responsibility in
the petitioner is indispensable, from the right of petitioning the
supreme power for the redress of grievances; for it would be an
absurd mockery in a government to hold out this privilege to its sub-
jects, and then punish them for the use of it.2
C. Modem Trends
After a relatively calm period, SLAPP-type suits reared their ugly
heads again over 150 years later during the civil rights movement of the
1960s. These suits were frequently filed against activists who boycotted
merchants in protest of racial discrimination. 22 Since the 1960s, the
incidence of SLAPPs has increased dramatically, ultimately becoming a
major threat to involved citizens.23 Prevalence of SLAPPs is particu-
larly evident in the areas of environmental matters ("eco-SLAPPs") and
real estate development. However, their effects can be seen in any area
involving political activities, such as "circulating a petition, writing a
letter to the editor, testifying at a public hearing, reporting violations of
law, lobbying for legislation, peacefully demonstrating, or otherwise
attempting to influence government action."2
Whatever claims are asserted by the SLAPP filer, their intent is
clear: SLAPPs act as a continuing threat to fundamental American val-
ues.25 Though statistics demonstrate that the suits routinely fail in court,
they tend to have devastating economic and chilling effects, allowing
them to succeed in their underlying purpose-silencing concerned pub-
lic citizens into submission.
26
II. AN ATTEMPT AT LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
To counteract the chilling effect of SLAPPs, some states have
19. See id. at 132, 134.
20. See id. at 139.
21. Id. at 139-40.
22. See Jennifer E. Sills, Comment, SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation): How Can the Legal System Eliminate Their Appeal?, 25 CONN. L. REv. 547, 549
(1993).
23. See PRiNG & CANAN, supra note 6, at 3.
24. See Alexandra Dylan Lowe, The Price of Speaking Out, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 48.
25. See Pring & Canan, supra note 9, at *22.
26. See id.
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enacted anti-SLAPP legislation. These statutes are designed to protect a
citizen's First Amendment right to speak out against impending commu-
nity development plans without fear of being sued by the developers
they oppose as a result. Although the intent of the anti-SLAPP statutes
is genuine, problems arise from the statutes' language, which catego-
rizes the activities sought to be protected in broad terms, providing little
guidance to the courts applying them.
The difficulty in identifying a SLAPP exists because it requires
evaluating the filer's motivation. Thus, the questions raised include: Is
the suit a retaliatory reaction, or is it based on a legitimate belief of
having been wronged? Can a legislature enact a statute that provides a
remedy for a plaintiff who legitimately believes he has been denied a
valid economic opportunity or has been defamed, while singling out a
true SLAPP filer? Unfortunately, there are no simple answers to these
complex questions, though several states have tried to provide answers
with varied levels of success.
A. Universal Legislative Intent
Currently, in recognition of the essential role that public participa-
tion plays in a democracy, eleven states have passed laws directed at
suppressing a SLAPP filer's incentive to initiate such suits.2 7 These
states are California,28 Delaware,29 Georgia,3 ° Maine,31 Massachusetts,32
Minnesota,33 Nebraska,34 Nevada,35 New York,3 6 Rhode Island,37 and
Washington. 38  In addition, anti-SLAPP bills have been proposed in
Florida, Indiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Texas, but have been defeated either at the congressional
or gubernatorial level.39
27. See PRINo & CANAN, supra note 6, at 189. Georgia and Maine have since passed anti-
SLAPP legislation, bringing the total number of states at the time of this publication to eleven.
28. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 1997) (effective Jan. 1, 1993).
29. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-8138 (Supp. 1996) (effective July 16, 1992).
30. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (Supp. 1997) (effective Apr. 1, 1996).
31. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (West Supp. 1997).
32. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West Supp. 1997) (effective Jan. 1, 1995).
33. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 554.01-05 (West Supp. 1997) (effective Jan. 1, 1995).
34. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,241 to 25-21,246 (1995).
35. See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.640-.670 (Supp. 1993) (effective July 13, 1993).
36. See N.Y. Civ. RiGHTs LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998) (effective Jan. 1,
1993); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 3211(g), 3212(h) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
37. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4 (Supp. 1996) (effective Jan. 1, 1994).
38. See WASH. Rnv. CODE ANm. §§ 4.24.500-.520 (West Supp. 1997) (effective Jan. 1, 1990).
39. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 6, at 189; Mamie Stetson, Note, Reforming SLAPP
Reform: New York's Anti-SLAPP Statute, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1324, 1326 n.12 (1995); Opinion of
the Justices, 641 A.2d 1012 (N.H. 1994); Kyle Niederpruem, Lawmakers Strike Back Against
SLAPP Lawsuits, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 17, 1998, at A01.
[Vol. 52:587
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The scope and effectiveness of the anti-SLAPP laws vary widely,
though they share a common purpose and several procedural aspects.
For instance, generally stated, the purpose and intent of the anti-SLAPP
legislation is to encourage public participation and discourage intimida-
tion of such participation through the use of abusive litigation tactics.
This general statement is contained in the preambles to the California
and Georgia laws.' However, some states, such as Delaware, Nebraska,
and New York, limit their statutes' broad protection by confining the
focus to First Amendment rights exercised in public fora.41
Nebraska's law can be distinguished from the others in its explicitly
stated purpose of striking a balance between the right to file lawsuits for
perceived injuries and "the constitutional rights of persons to petition,
speech, and association ...to the maximum extent permitted by law
.... "42 On the other end of the spectrum, the statutes of Delaware,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Nevada do not recite any purpose for
enactment. However, some purpose can be implied from the Delaware
and Nevada statutes due to the specificity with which the statutes
describe the activities designed to be protected.43 Conversely, the Mas-
sachusetts and Minnesota laws leave too much to interpretation and pro-
vide little guidance for courts to so interpret. 44
Professors Pring and Canan have devised a litmus test for determin-
ing the efficacy and validity of an anti-SLAPP statute. To provide ade-
quate protection and correspondingly encourage public participation,
they believe the law must possess the following characteristics:
It must cover all public advocacy and communications to govern-
ment, whether direct or indirect and whether in the form of testi-
mony, letters, reports of crime, peaceful demonstrations, or petitions.
... It must cover all government bodies and agents ....
... It must set out an effective early review for filed SLAPPs, shift-
ing the burden of proof to the filer and, in so doing, serving a clear
warning against the future filing of such suits.
45
40. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-
11.1(a) (Supp. 1997).
41. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136(a) (Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,242(1)
(1995); N.Y. CIrv. RIGHTs LAW § 76-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
42. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,241(4) (1995).
43. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136(a) (Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.650
(Supp. 1993).
44. The language of Maine's legislation is almost verbatim to that of Massachusetts' statute,
except the assessment of attorneys' fees and costs to a successful moving party is discretionary
under the Maine statute and mandatory under Massachusetts' law. Thus, any discussion regarding
the Massachusetts statute will apply equally to the Maine statute.
45. PRaIN & CANAN, supra note 6, at 189.
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B. Comparative Analysis of Enacted Anti-SLAPP Statutes
1. PROTECTED ACTIVITIES COVERED BY LEGISLATION
A side-by-side statutory analysis of the enacted laws illustrates
their similarities while also evidencing their glaring differences. The
most obvious differences, and indeed the source of interpretive diffi-
culty, are found in the conduct and activities that the statutes purport to
immunize from liability in civil actions.
California's statute endeavors to protect all acts in furtherance of a
person's right to petition or free speech in connection with a public
issue, which includes:
[A]ny written or oral statement or writing made before a legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceed-
ing authorized by law; any written or oral statement or writing made
in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legis-
lative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law.
4 6
This coverage is similar to that expressed in both the Georgia and Rhode
Island statutes.47
At first glance, the California statute appears to clearly and specifi-
cally identify protected activities, but it then deviates by addending
broad immunity for "any written or oral statement or writing made in a
place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of
public interest."48 Similarly, the Rhode Island statute broadens the areas
of protected activity to include "any written or oral statement made in
connection with an issue of public concern."49 Inclusion of these indefi-
nite activities expands the protection afforded by the petition clause of
the First Amendment. Such an expansion could prove lethal to actions
raising defamation claims due to the difficulty in succinctly defining "an
issue of public interest or concern" and "a place open to the public."5
The inference that can be drawn is that anything said anywhere outside
of a person's home is protected. This, in and of itself, contravenes tradi-
tional constitutional analysis.
The common dilemma is that the exercise of one right-to pursue a
claim through the judicial process-conflicts with the full, robust exer-
cise of free speech and petition rights. California focused on this very
46. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West Supp. 1997).
47. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(C) (Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(e) (Supp.
1996).
48. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West Supp. 1997).
49. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(e) (Supp. 1996).




conflict when the law was proposed, noting the concern that adopting
short-cut procedures would "invade the province of the jury and conflict
with the right to [a] jury trial.""
Georgia, although adopting similar predicating language concern-
ing the areas it seeks to protect, limits, rather than expands, the privi-
leged conduct by listing specifications for its otherwise broad
protection. 2 Communications deemed privileged under the statute are
those:
Statements made with a good faith intent on the part of the
speaker to protect his or her interest in a matter in which it is
concerned;
... Statements made in good faith as part of an act in
furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition...
in connection with an issue of public interest or concern... ;
... Fair and honest reports of the proceedings of legislative
or judicial bodies;
... Fair and honest reports of court proceedings; [and]
... Comments of counsel, fairly made, on the circumstances
of a case in which he or she is involved and on the conduct of the
parties in connection therewith.53
Unlike California and Rhode Island, Georgia does not provide protection
for all statements made which can be deemed relative to a public interest
issue made in a place frequented by the public.
The Massachusetts statute echoes those of California, Georgia, and
Rhode Island, but dilutes the effect by including:
[A]ny statement reasonably likely to encourage consideration or
review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or judicial body or any
other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to
enlist public participation in an effort to effect such consideration; or
any other statement falling within constitutional protection of the
right to petition government.54
The glaring defect in these statutes is that by broadly defining the activi-
ties to be protected, they may immunize from scrutiny the very lawsuits
they seek to discourage, as well as all other statements that could be
characterized as having been made to persuade others to participate in a
51. Lowe, supra note 24, at 53. California's legislation finally passed following vetoes by
Governor George Deukmejian in 1990 and Governor Pete Wilson in 1991. Governor Wilson
ultimately signed anti-SLAPP legislation into law in 1992, which is codified at section 425.16 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure. See Mark Goldowitz, Study Outline Regarding
Legislative Developments, in SLAPPs: STRATEGIC LAwSurrs AGAiNST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
GovEmENr, C935 ALI-ABA 195, *199 (1994).
52. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-7 (Supp. 1997).
53. Id.
54. MAss. Gm. LAws Am. ch. 231, § 59H (West Supp. 1997).
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matter of public importance, no matter how small the percentage of the
public would be affected. Thus, in the absence of any express legislative
purpose, these statutes provide little guidance to distinguish a SLAPP
suit from one which is grounded on a genuinely actionable tort claim. 55
Significantly, Massachusetts passed its anti-SLAPP statute over the
veto of Governor William F. Weld, who was concerned about a variety
of procedural difficulties presented by the law and about the law's
potential impact on substantive law. 56 The breadth of the definitions
tend to raise questions as to the intended reach of the statute, which,
interpreted broadly, would envelop a wide range of activities, some only
tenuously related to "governmental activity. 57 Such was Governor
Weld's concern, as stated in his veto message: "Effectively, the bill
covers any statement on a policy issue and thus would completely
change the law of libel, slander and abuse of process." 58 Governor Weld
vehemently opposed the law as being a "bludgeon where a scalpel
would do," and proselytized that such a law would alter the "balanced
and long-settled law."5 9
The author of the Massachusetts statute, Representative David
Cohen, rationalized that the law was necessary because the state's envi-
ronmental laws depend on active citizen participation.60 He noted that
community officials cannot fulfill their duties if citizens do not speak
out because they fear economic ruin as a result of being sued.61 On the
other hand, critics of the law were concerned that the statute would
"grant a quasi-immunity to zoning vigilantes.., who grossly distort a
project's impacts or accuse a board official of being 'bought' by a pro-
55. The legislative analysis of Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP statute is equally vague. In
analyzing the need for legislation, it was determined that SLAPPs are filed to intimidate or punish
people for participating in constitutionally protected activities. Although usually unsuccessful, the
suits cost their victims excessive legal fees, personal time, and anxiety over the uncertainty of
impending litigation. See Bart J. Gordon, Law May Have Unanticipated Effects, MASS. LAW.
WKLY., Mar. 6, 1995, at 11.
56. In his veto message, Governor Weld stated:
Under the bill, any claim allegedly falling within its broad definition must be
dismissed unless the person bringing the suit shows that the statement in question is
devoid of any reasonable support. The bill would thus shift the normal burden of
proof and erect a nearly insurmountable barrier to a suit, thereby transforming the
law and preventing an absolute privilege for the right to petition, for the first time.
John L. Kennedy, Bill Targets Environmental Intimidation Lawsuits, PENiN. L. WKLY., Oct. 31,
1994, at 11.
57. See Gordon, supra note 55.
58. Id.
59. Tort; SLAPP-Opposition to Liquor License, MASS. LAW. WKLY., June 3, 1996, at 18
(quoting 1994 House Doc. No. 5570 at 3; 1994 House Doc. No. 5604).





ponent or [the use of] other hyperbolic excess."6 2 In essence, the fear
was that the statute would provide project opponents the freedom to say
virtually anything about a project, whether true or not, whether for the
good of the community as a whole or not, and whether with malicious
intent or not.
63
Delaware, Nebraska, and New York cautiously worded their laws
to shelter only those activities that involve a public applicant or permit-
tee, and that are materially related to efforts to report on, rule on, chal-
lenge, or oppose the application or permit.64 A public applicant or
permittee is defined by these statutes as one who has applied for or
obtained a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate, or other
entitlement for use or permission to act from any government body, or a
person with an interest, connection, or affiliation with such person that is
materially related to such application or permission. 65 These definitions
impart a precise standard for courts to apply in discerning whether the
target's activity is absolutely immune from liability.
These constraints contrast sharply with Minnesota's overly broad
statute, which provides protection for speech or lawful conduct "genu-
inely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government
action," unless the conduct or speech "constitutes a tort or a violation of
a person's constitutional rights."66 In addition to being overly broad,
Minnesota's law inflicts two additional concerns on courts that must
interpret it. First, it does not define "favorable government action" that
would trigger protection. Second, it dilutes the protection granted by
excluding protection where "the conduct or speech constitutes a tort or a
violation of a person's constitutional rights," presumably those rights
independent of the right to petition government. 67 Like the Massachu-
setts law, Minnesota's law also fails to state its purpose, leaving courts
vulnerable to due process attacks for prematurely dismissing otherwise
valid claims.68
In contrast, Nevada's statute, though sparingly verbalized, requires
62. See Gordon, supra note 55.
63. See id.
64. See DE. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136(a)(1) (Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,242(1)
(1995); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 76-a(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
65. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136(a)(2) (Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,242(4)
(1995); N.Y. CIv. RiGHTS LAW § 76-a(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
66. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.03 (West Supp. 1997).
67. Id.
68. In a recent case brought under Minnesota's statute, a county court judge ruled that parts of
the SLAPP law were "clearly unconstitutional" as applied to citizens who posted allegedly
defamatory signs on their properties in order to discourage potential homebuyers from purchasing
from a developer whose development, the citizens contended, threatened the integrity of their
wetland area. See Doug Grow, Showing Signs of Not Quitting; Wetlands Defenders Taken Aback
by Their Threatening Reputation, STAR TinE. (Minneapolis), Feb. 9, 1997, at 2B. The judge
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minimal judicial interpretation.69 It explicitly immunizes from civil lia-
bility only those who in good faith communicate a complaint or infor-
mation to a legislator, officer or employee of the state, a political
subdivision, or of the federal government, "regarding a matter reason-
ably of concern to the respective governmental entity. 7 ° Similarly,
Washington immunizes only "good faith reports" made to federal, state,
or local agencies. 71 The assumption is that if the communication was
not specifically directed to a governmental entity in connection with a
public issue, as opposed to a general statement made to the public, the
communication would not receive protection under the statute.
2. PROCEDURAL ELEMENTS
Impliedly, all the anti-SLAPP laws were designed to allow a
speedy hearing by a judge and a quick dismissal where applicable,
though many of the statutes are not so explicit. The common statutory
scheme places the burdens of proof and persuasion on the filer to prove
that the target should not be protected. Many of the statutes permit a
countersuit by the target for legal fees and some even allow awards of
punitive damages in certain situations.72
Still, there are some procedural differences among the statutes. The
California and Massachusetts laws permit motions to dismiss to be filed
within sixty days of service of the complaint.73 In contrast, for all other
suits brought in California, a defendant has only thirty days to file a
response, 4 while in Massachusetts, a response must be filed within
twenty days. 75  Therefore, a defendant, by asserting that a suit is a
SLAPP, can use this procedural benefit to delay responding to an other-
wise meritorious claim.
allowed the case to go to a jury, rather than summarily dismissing it under Minnesota's anti-
SLAPP statute. See id.
69. Recently, the Nevada Legislature approved passage of a second anti-SLAPP statute. See
Sean Whaley, New Laws Take Effect Wednesday, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Sept. 28, 1997, at lB. The
new law is designed to broaden the definition of "what speech is protected from frivolous
defamation lawsuits." Sean Whaley, Frivolous Libel Lawsuit Measure Approved by Assembly,
LAS VEGAS REv.-J., June 19, 1997, at 4B. The underlying bill was ultimately approved subject to
an amendment requiring "critical statements made about people or their businesses [to] be truthful
or made 'without knowledge of falsehood."' Id.
70. See NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.650 (Supp. 1993).
71. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.500-.510 (West Supp. 1997).
72. See, e.g., DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8138(a) (Supp. 1996); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 554.04
(West Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,243(1) (1995); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1997-1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(d) (Supp. 1996).
73. See CAL. Cv. PRoc. CODE § 425.16(f) (West Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
231, § 59H (West Supp. 1997).
74. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 412.20(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997).
75. See MAss. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1).
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Half the states with SLAPP legislation mandate that courts order a
stay on all discovery upon the filing of a motion to dismiss pursuant to
their applicable statutes. However, they also allow the courts, upon
good cause shown, to order specified and limited discovery.76 The
remaining five states with anti-SLAPP legislation place no stays on dis-
covery, and, except for Nebraska, which provides for an expedited hear-
ing,77 there are no constraints on a plaintiff prohibiting him from
conducting discovery that may enable him to prevail at the eventual
hearing.
Most of the states place the burden of proof on the filer, or the
person opposing the motion to dismiss. For instance, the substance of
the Massachusetts statute provides that:
The court shall grant such special motion [to dismiss], unless the
party against whom such special motion is made shows that: (1) the
moving party's exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any
reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and (2) the
moving party's acts caused actual injury to the responding party.7"
Some of the statutes require a filer to establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the communication giving rise to the action was
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false.79 Meanwhile, the statutes of other states couch the burden
requirements in terms similar to those imposed by Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring that the claim be well grounded
in fact and warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.8 0
California's statute requires only that the filer establish a
probability that he will prevail on the claim." Though not as heavy a
burden as proof by clear and convincing evidence, when coupled with
the mandatory discovery stay, it constitutes an equally high hurdle to
overcome. In negotiating enactment of the bill, Senator Bill Lockyer,
Chairman of California's Senate Judiciary Committee, entered into a
compromise with Governor Wilson, who had voiced concerns that the
"pleading hurdle" proposed-a substantial probability that the filer
76. See CAL. Ciy. PRoc. CODE § 425.16(g) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-
11.1(d) (Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 554.02(2)(1) (West Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(b) (Supp. 1996).
77. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,245 (1995).
78. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West Supp. 1997).
79. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136(b) (Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 554.02(2)(3) (West Supp. 1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,244(1) (1995).
80. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8137(a) (Supp. 1996); GA. Con ANN. § 9-11-11. 1(b)
(Supp. 1997); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a(l)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
81. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
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would prevail-was too high for a plaintiff.8 2  The substantial
probability test is similar to that which must be overcome to sustain a
punitive damages claim against doctors and religious organizations.8 3
The governor contended that such a burden was too restrictive. In low-
ering the standard to a "reasonable probability" of success on the merits,
a plaintiff must only present "evidence that substantiates the claim. 84
The Rhode Island law is unique in providing a "sham exception" to
immunity.85 Under that law, if the petition or free speech constitutes a
sham, no immunity attaches to it. Activity defined as a sham is that
which is "not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government
action, result or outcome, regardless of ultimate motive or purpose. "86
A petition will be deemed a sham under the statute if it is objectively
baseless in that no reasonable person could realistically expect success
in procuring such government action. Likewise, a subjectively baseless
petition is a sham in that it is actually an attempt to use the governmen-
tal process for the party's own direct effect.87
As illustrated by the various statutes, there is an odd reversal of
roles between the parties in the SLAPP context in that the laws place the
burden of persuasion on the party opposing the motion to dismiss to
show the validity of the basis of his claim. Though this approach is
similar to that imposed by summary judgment procedures, because of
the limits placed on discovery, the non-movant is denied access to the
very evidence that the motion specifically requires be produced, and
which is instrumental in a summary judgment proceeding, as distin-
guished from a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. These laws also
radically rework the effect of the rules of civil procedure, as the special
motions to dismiss require an inquiry into the assessment of the facts
and the filer's motives, not merely the more flexible determination of
whether a pleading has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 8
3. STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED SANCTIONS
Most of the anti-SLAPP statutes provide for the mandatory recov-
82. See Jeffrey A. Benson & Dwight H. Merriam, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation (SLAPPs): An Overview, in LArND USE INsTrrTi: PLANNING, REGULATION,
LITIGATION, EMINrENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION, C750 ALI-ABA 837, *853 (1992).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(a) (Supp. 1996).
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6). Most states modeled their local rules pursuant to the federal




ery of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs when a target prevails on a
motion to dismiss.89 Delaware, Maine, Nebraska, and New York, how-
ever, give courts discretionary authority to award attorneys' fees and
costs to targets who succeed on motions to dismiss.9°
Ironically, only four states prescribe recovery of attorneys' fees and
costs to a successful filer who meets the extraordinary burden imposed
and overcomes the motion to dismiss.9 Nevada simply makes the
award mandatory. 92 California places a condition on the imposition of
attorneys' fees and costs, mandating an award if the court finds the
motion was brought for a frivolous reason or to otherwise delay the pro-
ceedings. 93 Nebraska merely makes imposition of fees and costs discre-
tionary once the falsity of the defendant's communication has been
established by clear and convincing evidence.94
In addition to fees and costs, most of the anti-SLAPP statutes per-
mit a target to recover compensatory damages and, in some instances,
punitive damages. The Minnesota and Rhode Island statutes mandate
the recovery of compensatory damages if the court determines that the
suit was filed to harass, inhibit public participation, interfere with the
exercise of protected rights, or otherwise wrongfully injure the target.95
By contrast, the courts of Delaware, Nebraska, and New York, upon
making the same determination, may award compensatory damages at
their discretion.96 Those states that provide for an award of punitive
damages in their statutes grant courts the discretion to determine
whether such a penalty should be imposed.97
89. See CAL. CIv. Paoc. CODE § 425.16(c) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-
11.1(b) (Supp. 1997); MASS. GFEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT.
Arm. § 554.04(1) (West Supp. 1997); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.670(1) (Supp. 1993). The
Washington statute does not expressly provide for a special motion to dismiss. However, it does
provide that a target "prevailing upon the defense provided for in this section shall be entitled to
recover costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in establishing the defense." WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.510 (West Supp. 1997).
90. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8138(a) (Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556
(West Supp. 1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,243(1) (1995); N.Y. Crv. RiGHTs LAW § 70-a(1)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
91. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 425.16(c) (West Supp. 1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,244
(1995); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.670(1) (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(d) (Supp.
1996).
92. See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.670(l) (Supp. 1993).
93. See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 425.16(c) (West Supp. 1997).
94. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,244 (1995).
95. See MNN. STAT. ANN. § 554.04(2)(b) (West Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(d)
(Supp. 1996).
96. See Di.. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8138(a)(1) (Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,243(1)
(1995); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998).
97. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8138(a)(2) (Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.04(2)(b)
(West Supp. 1997); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1997-1998); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-33-2(d) (Supp. 1996).
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4. QUICK SYNOPSIS OF LEGISLATION
California's anti-SLAPP law is silent as to both compensatory and
punitive damages, 98 and makes no provision for a cause of action for a
prevailing target (a "SLAPP-back"). The statute is of limited duration,
requiring the Judicial Council to review its efficacy and report its find-
ings to the California Legislature on or before January 1, 1998. Califor-
nia's statute is very broadly drawn as to the activity covered, although it
places a less demanding burden on a filer, requiring only a demonstra-
tion of probability of prevailing on the merits, as opposed to requiring
proof by clear and convincing evidence. 99
The Delaware statute does not provide for an expedited hearing,
nor does it mention anything about a stay of discovery pending resolu-
tion of the special motion to dismiss. It does, however, include a
SLAPP-back provision for a successful target. Like Nebraska's statute,
Delaware's is loosely drawn and, though it narrowly defines the actors
who may trigger invocation of the statute, the definition of "communica-
tion" leaves much to interpretation, by defining it as "any statement,
claim or allegation in a proceeding, decision, protest, writing, argument,
contention or other expression."" The statute does not specify whether
an objectionable communication must be stated to or before a govern-
mental body, or in a forum other than a public hearing.
The Georgia statute makes no mention as to the standard of proof
or evidentiary burdens required of a filer, nor whether the filer has the
burden at the hearing. Otherwise, the statute appears to be a good
attempt at ensuring that the proceedings are fair to both parties. It also
restricts the activity subject to protection.
The Massachusetts law seems narrow in scope, but the activities
covered actually makes it appear more expansive. It does not place the
clear and convincing evidence burden on the filer. Additionally, it does
not express any purpose or legislative intent, nor does it provide for any
reimbursement of fees or costs for the successful filer. Although gui-
dance has been provided through judicial interpretation, some recent
cases show ambiguity as to the limits of the law's protection.
Minnesota's statute is perhaps the most broadly drawn of all the
anti-SLAPP statutes, affording little or no guidance for judicial interpre-
tation as to the activity protected or the fora in which the activity impli-
cates the statute. Thus, as written, it can lead to the protection of
anything that is arguably "aimed in whole or in part at procuring
98. This is significant in light of the awards rendered in suits discussed infra note 227.
99. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West Supp. 1997).
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136(a)(3) (Supp. 1996).
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favorable government action.""1 ° It provides no protection to the filer
for a frivolous motion brought by the target and is silent as to the expe-
diency of hearing a special motion to dismiss. The immunity section is
contradictory in that it first grants immunity based on its definition of
public participation, but then exempts protection if the conduct or
speech constitutes a tort or violation of a person's constitutional
rights, 10 2 which is the usual basis for the underlying claim in the first
place. Absent judicial interpretation, it is difficult to reconcile the gross
contradictions in the statute, and it appears that the statute was intention-
ally drawn this way due to the obvious absence of a policy and purpose
in its preamble. 103
Nebraska's statute, by contrast, seems more narrow in its intent. It
confines the parameters of the underlying activity which can invoke the
sanctity of the statute."° Though it includes the right to free speech,
recovery is limited to those instances that involve a permittee or public
applicant to a governmental body and those who oppose him, and does
not stretch protection, as other statutes have, to protect any statement
relative to an issue of public concern or interest, which broadens the
qualification to an indefinable and limitless universe of activity. 05
Nebraska's statute is silent as to a stay of discovery, and places no time
limit on when a motion to dismiss shall be heard, except on an expedited
or priority basis.
As drafted, Nevada's statute has the narrowest scope of all the anti-
SLAPP statutes. 10 6 While it is specific as to the activity protected, it is
not specific as to the fora in which the communication must be made.
There are no express special provisions for a motion to dismiss, expedi-
ency of hearing the motion, or the burdens intended to be placed on
either of the parties, if any. It fairly provides for the award of fees to
any party who prevails and allows for the intervention of a legal repre-
sentative of the governmental entity to which the communication is
made.
New York's statute is very similar to Delaware's except that it sup-
plies no procedures for the filing of a special motion to dismiss or for
expediency of a hearing thereon. It does limit the activity protected, and
though it does not define the terms "public forum" or "issue of public
concern," in the few cases in which the statute has been interpreted, it
101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.01(6) (West Supp. 1997).
102. See id. § 554.03.
103. But see discussion supra note 68.
104. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,242 (1995).
105. Compare id. with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West Supp. 1997).
106. But see supra note 69.
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seems likely that the courts seek to narrowly confine the immunity to
very specific activities.
The statute passed in Rhode Island is close to, yet narrower than,
that enacted by Massachusetts. However, it does not provide for an
expedited hearing on the motion to dismiss, and appears to treat the pre-
vailing party more fairly. °7 Also, it is silent as to who has the burden at
the hearing on the special motion to dismiss and the applicable standard
of that burden.
The protection and procedures in Washington's statute are wholly
non-existent. Although the statute recognizes the vital importance of
citizen participation and the deterrent effect of threatened litigation for a
citizen's exercise of the right to report "potential wrongdoing," the stat-
ute is silent in providing procedural avenues different from those avail-
able to other litigants.10 8 Indeed, it provides no guidance to courts and,
therefore, seems superfluous in its intent to protect an individual exercis-
ing his right to petition government for redress.
C. Broad Versus Narrow Statutory Construction
As illustrated by the vague definitions of the terms used to identify
the activities and actors intended to be immune from civil liability for
legitimate exercise of their right to petition, the fundamental problem in
attempting to formulate a uniform procedure for detecting and judicially
managing a SLAPP lies in the difficultly in drawing a bright line
between a true SLAPP and a meritorious claim. In some cases, a
SLAPP can be clearly identified. Other times, a claim may have a modi-
cum of merit, or even a great deal of merit. And, of course, the possibil-
ity exists that the filer has a legitimate, albeit mistaken, belief that his
claim has merit.109
Real obstacles exist in researching a pattern for the filing of
SLAPPs for several reasons. First, since the original claims are based on
actionable torts, those states without anti-SLAPP legislation apply tradi-
tional First Amendment and tort analyses in assessing the validity of the
allegations. Second, many SLAPP targets retreat from their positions to
avoid prolonged and expensive litigation. Third, and perhaps most frus-
trating, the majority of the decisions are rendered at the trial court level;
therefore, there are no published reports of the proceedings and findings.
107. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(d) (Supp. 1996).
108. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.500-.520 (West Supp. 1997). Although the statute
professes to provide immunity from civil liability, it appears that a target must still be subjected to
full-blown litigation before any relief, such as costs and fees incurred, can be awarded. See id.
§ 4.24.510. Thus, unless the target can afford the financial burdens of litigation, any relief
provided in the statute will not act as a deterrent to the filer. See id.
109. Benson & Merriam, supra note 82, at *848.
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Although there is a paucity of reported decisions, in some jurisdic-
tions, the suits are prevalent enough to have attracted the attention of the
legal media."' In those states, the courts appear committed to protect-
ing citizens' petition activities regardless of how blatantly offensive or
false their statements may be.11' However, in the majority of cases, the
courts appear equally committed to deciding each case on its specific
facts, precluding the uniformity and precedential value obtained through
decisions rendered by appellate tribunals.' 2
Anti-SLAPP statutes have been construed most frequently in the
courts of California and Massachusetts. California courts have given its
statute a very broad interpretation, but have also reached contradictory
decisions among the state's appellate districts.1
1 3
A slander suit arising from a private dispute is not covered by Cali-
fornia's anti-SLAPP statute, according to the state's First District Court
of Appeal.' 14 This is true even where the dispute spawned a prior legal
proceeding.' In construing the statute and denying the target's special
motion to dismiss, that court opined that the statute was narrowly drawn
to discourage a type of suit that chills public participation and does not
apply to actions concerning matters lacking public significance. 16
This appellate decision reversed the order rendered by the San
Francisco Superior Court, which dismissed the complaint and ordered
the filer to pay the target's fees and costs incurred in defending the
suit.' 17 In the underlying defamation action, Xi Zhao, a molecular biolo-
gist, sued Daniel Tai-Yui Wong for having allegedly accused Zhao of
murdering Wong's brother. Wong's brother had apparently died under
"mysterious circumstances" while Zhao, who had been living with him
for the previous three years, was dining with another man whom she
later married. The whole dispute arose from a proceeding to determine
the validity of a purported will in which Wong's brother devised his
110. To this date, there are over 400 stories referencing SLAPP litigation and legislation
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS file.
111. See Robert I. McMurry & David H. Pierce, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation (SLAPPs): The Benefits and Risks, in LAND USE INSTrrTTE: PLANNING,
REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DoMArN, AND COMPENSATION, C750 ALI-ABA 823, *833
(1992).
112. See id. at *834.
113. See discussion infra Part IMl.A. Even SLAPP co-creator Professor Canan concedes that
"some states, including California, have enacted laws that are too broad and go beyond the intent
of the anti-SLAPP movement .... Sean Whaley, Measure Targets Lawsuits, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Feb. 7, 1997, at 1B.
114. See Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 1130-33 (Ct. App. 1996).
115. See id. at 1131.
116. See id. at 1133.
117. See id. at 1118.
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entire estate to Zhao.11 8
The trial court interpreted the statute very broadly, stating that it
applied to suits not typically characterized as SLAPPs.119 Put this way,
the court reasoned that any comment made about a judicial proceeding is
an act in furtherance of a person's right to petition or free speech.120
However, the First District cautioned against such an expansive interpre-
tation, stating that the statute was intended only to protect comments
about governmental activities or matters affecting the common interests
of a substantial part of the community-typical petition-clause-protected
activity.1
21
The appellate opinion further noted that the statute states a very
specific purpose, and therefore, it cannot be assumed that the legislature
intended to broadly deny discovery, which is automatically stayed when
a motion to strike under section 425.16 is filed in actions requiring proof
of malice, since such proof can usually only be obtained through discov-
ery. 1 22 The court found that the only petition right arguably implicated
involved Wong's effort to influence the coroner's investigation of his
brother's cause of death. However, the court found that this connection
was too tenuous to invoke the First Amendment right to petition the
government for redress regarding an issue of public interest.123
A ruling by Judge Diane Wayne of the Los Angeles Superior Court
dealt the advocates of broad interpretation another blow. The case, dis-
posed of at the trial court level, was filed by Elizabeth Taylor, who was
seeking to enjoin a broadcaster from using the actress' name or likeness
for private commercial purposes. NBC had planned to air a mini-
series in which, Taylor alleged, she was to be parodied in an unflattering
manner. Judge Wayne rejected NBC's argument that Taylor's suit was a
SLAPP, noting that the cause of action did not arise in connection with a
public issue. She found that NBC had not presented facts suggesting the
suit was filed to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights, but
rather they showed the suit was brought "in good faith for the purpose of
deterring a potentially unflattering rendition of [Taylor's] life story."'' 2
5
The California Supreme Court denied a special motion to dismiss
pursuant to the state's anti-SLAPP statute in a libel suit brought by Alan
118. See Zhao v. Wong (In re Estate of Wong), 40 Cal. App. 4th 1198 (Ct App. 1995).
119. See Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1119.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 1120-23.
122. See id. at 1129.
123. See id. at 1132.
124. Taylor v. National Broad. Co., Inc., No. BC 110922, 1994 WL 762226, at *1 (Cal. Super.
Ct. L.A. County Sept. 29, 1994).
125. Id. at *7. "To apply CCP § 425.16 to the facts of this case would be to chill the rights of
litigants who are on the 'cutting edge' with new and novel legal theories." Id. at *8.
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Shugart, a candidate for public office, against a campaign committee
that supported the opposing candidate.1 26 The suit arose out of a bit-
terly-fought initiative campaign in which Shugart contended that televi-
sion ads which linked him to convicted savings and loan swindler
Charles Keating, Jr. through computer manipulation, and which urged
voters to protect themselves against "the next Charles Keating," sub-
jected him to "cruel and unjust hardship." '27 The court found that there
were no grounds for the special motion to dismiss as the suit was not
prima facie retaliation against the defendants' exercise of free speech
and decided that a reasonable jury could find Shugart had been libeled.
Therefore, the suit was allowed to proceed to trial on the merits. 2 '
The leading California case which properly upheld the state's anti-
SLAPP legislation involved a dispute between certified shorthand
reporters and an alliance of certified shorthand reporters, alleging that
the alliance's practice of "direct contracting" constituted an unfair busi-
ness practice, intentional interference with prospective economic advan-
tage, and interference with existing contracts. 29 The alliance cross-
claimed for defamation and conspiracy to unlawfully restrain trade via a
boycott of the alliance's reporting services. 130 Wilcox, a cross-defend-
ant, filed a motion to strike pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute,
which the trial court denied.' 3 ' However, the Second Appellate District
reversed the trial court, noting that the statute does not apply to all cases
in which a First Amendment defense is raised, but is limited to exposing
and dismissing suits calculated to chill the valid exercise of constitu-
tional rights guaranteed under the free speech and petition clauses of the
First Amendment.
1 32
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the filer's argument that
even though the issue of "direct contracting," by being part of a judicial
challenge, was a public issue as defined by the statute, the defamatory
statements and conspiratorial business injuries had no rational connec-
tion to the judicial proceedings. 33 Instead, the court found that Wilcox
126. See Consumers and Their Attorneys Against Propositions 200, 201 and 202 v. Superior
Court, Case No.: S054494 (Cal. 1996), summarized in Bill Ainsworth, Libel Suit Against
Plaintiffs Lawyers Allowed to Proceed, THE RECORDER, July 3, 1996, at 1.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 814 (Ct. App. 1994). "Direct
contracting" refers to a practice whereby a certified shorthand reporter, or association thereof,
enters into an exclusive contract with a major consumer of reporting services which grants the
reporter the ability to report depositions taken by attorneys representing that consumer. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 815.
132. See id. at 819.
133. See id. at 821.
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had issued the statements "in the context of exhorting shorthand report-
ers to contribute to the cost of pursuing that litigation." 3'
In a subsequent decision concerning the same dispute, but involv-
ing a motion to strike filed by a different cross-defendant, the Second
Appellate District reversed the trial court's order granting the motion.'
35
In this instance, the court determined that the utterances made by the
cross-defendant were defamatory, 136 and that these coercive activities
violated California's anti-trust law.' 37 In reaching its decision, the court
thoroughly reviewed the statute and considered its applicability to the
allegedly protected activity and found that the asserted privilege did not
attach.
As previously stated, the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute leaves
too much to interpretation and offers little guidance. Nevertheless, the
courts of that state have been relatively uniform and restrictive in apply-
ing the statute. In fact, the opinions generally show that the courts have
been less than eager to characterize a suit as a SLAPP, perhaps in defer-
ence to the concerns articulated in Governor Weld's veto message.
138
Shortly after passage of the Massachusetts statute, a judge in
Worcester County found that the statute did not apply to the activities of
property owners who had placed "for sale" signs and participated in
other private actions to discourage prospective buyers of the plaintiffs
proposed development.' 39 In that case, the defendants, who owned lots
in a subdivision, had petitioned the government in an unsuccessful effort
to force a developer to convert a private common drive into a public
street. The developer subsequently filed suit against these property
owners, alleging defamation and intentional interference with contrac-
tual and advantageous business relations in an attempt to drive the
developer out of business or coerce it to modify the common drive
134. Id. at 821-22. The defamation claim was based on a memorandum circulated by Wilcox
in which she described the impending lawsuit of the alliance and solicited financial contributions
for litigation costs from the recipients of the memorandum. See id. at 825. The conspiracy claim
was based on the same memorandum in that the alliance alleged Wilcox's plea to "band[ ]
together ... to permanently put the Alliance to rest once and for all" inferred an attempt at an
agreement between Wilcox and others to injure the alliance in their reputations or business
ventures. See id. at 828 (second alteration in original).
135. See Cross Complaint Is Dismissed Under SLAPP but Action for Defamation and Unfair
Competition Can Proceed, 96 DAILY J. D.A.R. 14205, 14214, Nov. 29, 1996 (discussing Peters v.
Saunders, Case No. B092492 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
136. See id. at 14207. In speaking with another court reporter, Saunders called Peters a crook
who had been caught in the commission of a fraud. See id.
137. See Cross Complaint, supra note 135, at 14211, 14213.
138. See supra note 56.
139. See Wigwam Assocs., Inc. v. McBride, Civil Action No. 92-01570A (Worcester County
filed May 28, 1992), summarized in Matthew Mitchell, Superior Courts Begin Deciding "Anti-
SLAPP Suit" Motions, MAss. ENvrL. COMPLIANCE UPDATE, Vol. 4:2 (Dec. 1995).
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plan.140 The property owners characterized the suit as a SLAPP and
filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.
The court denied the motion, finding the plaintiff was seeking "redress
for alleged statements made and actions performed outside the context
of petitioning the government." '' The court found that the property
owners had engaged in misconduct in the nature of "badmouthing" the
developer to prospective home buyers and contractors, interpreted as a
form of "self-help" designed to economically coerce the relief which
they had unsuccessfully sought to effectuate from governmental entities
and in so doing, to drive the developer out of business.1
4 2
As rationale for its decision, the court found that the offensive
statements were not made to any of the boards considering the viability
of the developer's petition. Indeed, the statements "were not made
before or submitted to any governmental or judicial entity," but ratier
were made to potential buyers in order to discourage sales.' 43 The judge
in this instance properly narrowed an "overly broad" statute, drawing a
distinction that had not previously been drawn. Counsel for the devel-
oper pointed out that the statute was intended to stop harassment, and
must be narrowly construed "so it doesn't prevent justifiable lawsuits to
prevent inappropriate behavior.'
Conversely, in another action, an Essex County judge ruled that
writing letters to the editor of a newspaper falls under the statute's pro-
tection "if the letters are statements that are 'reasonably likely to
encourage consideration or review' by the government, or are 'reason-
ably likely to enlist public participation."" 45 The letters at issue were
written by the counter-defendants to the Boston Globe, asserting that the
counter-plaintiffs were engaging in environmentally unsound and dan-
gerous activities at an industrial site located near the counter-defendants'
residences. 4 6 The court correctly concluded that the letters were written
to bolster a cause the authors had been advocating before the town and,
therefore, were "reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review
o .. r... [to] enlist public participation."' 47
In a more recent Essex County case, another judge denied a special
140. See "Badmouthing" of Subdivision Developer, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 30, 1995, at 12.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See David L. Yas, Developer Can Pursue "Badmouthing" Claim; Anti-SLAPP Dismissal
Motion Is Denied, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 30, 1995, at 1 (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Thomson v. Town of Andover, Civil Action No. 93-1716 (Essex County), reported in
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motion to dismiss filed by the defendant. 14 8 In that case, the plaintiff
had sold her home and used the proceeds to help her daughter and son-
in-law buy a house. She then filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment
that she owned a fifty percent interest in the house, or alternatively, that
pursuant to an agreement, she had a right to live in the house for life
rent-free. The son-in-law counterclaimed, charging abuse of process
and seeking reimbursement for the plaintiff's use and occupancy of the
house. The plaintiff responded by moving to dismiss the counterclaim
pursuant to Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP law. As grounds for denying
the motion, the court stated that "the scope of the statute does not
encompass the circumstances of this case."149 The court reasoned that
the claim did not involve a matter of public concern, but instead
involved a private dispute, rendering the statute inapplicable since the
exercise of the constitutional right to petition was not implicated.
1 50
The language of the Massachusetts statute is so broad that it could
be construed to apply in almost any situation; however, this would sig-
nificantly alter procedural and substantive law. Absent a clear legisla-
tive intent to abrogate existing law, such a broad construction should not
be lightly undertaken. 5' Legislation should be interpreted according to
the statutory language, considered in connection with the reasons for
enactment and the main goal to be accomplished.1 52 In construing the
statute, Massachusetts courts have protected "every bona fide exercise of
the right to petition, regardless of the motivation of the petitioner, so
long as the exercise of the right meets the criteria set forth in the
statute."
1 53
In the first case interpreting New York's anti-SLAPP statute, the
148. Sullivan v. Murphy, Civil Action No. 94-2866B (Essex County), reported in Civil




151. See Cook v. Hanover Ins. Co., 592 N.E.2d 773, 776 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
152. See McNeil v. Commissioner of Correction, 633 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Mass. 1994).
153. Andover Liquors, Inc. v. Den Rock Liquors, Inc., Civil Action No. 96-0032-C (Essex
County 1996), reported in Tort; SLAPP-Opposition to Liquor License, MASS. LAW. WKLY., June
3, 1996, at 18. Unfortunately, in a couple of recent Massachusetts cases, judges retreated from the
narrow construction. In one of the cases, brought by a company against a former employee for
breach of a confidentiality agreement, it was determined "that the SLAPP statute is not confined
to claims against persons exercising their right of petition in a matter of public concern ......
Durocraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., Docket No. 96-P-1203, reported in Tort; SLAPP-
Matter of Public Concern-Confidentiality Agreement, MASS. LAW. WaLY., May 12, 1997, at 22.
In another case, a district court judge took the novel approach of using the statute to prevent a
husband from suing his wife who was seeking to enforce a restraining order against him. See
Mark A. Cohen, Anti-SLAPP Law Bars Man's 209A Countersuit; Sued After Cleared of TRO-
Violation Claim, MAss. LAW. WKLY., May 5, 1997, at 1.
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law was given a very narrow construction. 15 4 In so doing, the court
found that the statute did not apply to a suit brought against residents
trying to delay a federal clean-up loan to their homeowners' association
because, as statutorily defined, the loan application process did not con-
stitute a public proceeding. The court noted that the anti-SLAPP law
created a new cause of action by placing restrictions on a public appli-
cant's ability to access the court by requiring him to demonstrate that his
claim has a substantial, rather than reasonable, basis in law or fact. 155
The court recognized that the new law, being in derogation of the
common law, must be narrowly construed. 156 Therefore, the only way a
plaintiff could maintain a cause of action under the statute was if he
directly challenged the permit application, which was not done in this
case.157 Contrarily, a loan application is merely a request for money and
does not make a borrower a "public applicant" seeking permission to act
from a government body.
1 58
III. SLAPP SUITS IN ACTION
SLAPPs have become a widespread tactic since 1970.159 "SLAPPs
are filed by one side of a public, political dispute to punish and/or pre-
vent opposing points of view." 160 They "privatize" public issues and
fora, by transforming a public issue in a political forum into a private
legal dispute in an adjudicative forum. 1 61 However, this transformation
has happened in the reverse, by taking a private dispute between two
individuals and declaring that since others may be interested in an issue
collateral to the litigation, an aura of public interest is created.
The most frequently filed SLAPPs involve real estate development,
zoning, and land use issues.1 62 Other favored issues, in descending
order, are criticism of public officials and employees, environmental and
animal rights protection, civil and human rights, neighborhood
problems, and consumer issues. 1 6 3  A natural deduction from this pat-
tern is that most of the suits are triggered by contact on a local govern-
ment level, and only infrequently by activity on the federal level.16"
To gain access to court, filers claim a judicially cognizable injury,
154. See Harfenes v. Sea Gate Ass'n, Inc., 167 Misc. 2d 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
155. See id. at 652.
156. See id. at 652-53.
157. See id. at 653.
158. See id.
159. See Pring & Canan, supra note 9, at *9.
160. Id.
161. See id. at *9-10.
162. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 6, at 213.
163. See id. at 213 & 267 n.26.
164. See id. at 213.
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translating the offending political behavior into legalistic tort claims. 165
Typically, the suits allege: defamation (e.g., libel, slander, and business
libel), business torts (e.g., interference with contract, antitrust, trade
restraint, and unfair competition), process violations (e.g., malicious
prosecution, judicial or administrative abuse of process), conspiracy,
civil and constitutional rights violations, and other legal violations (e.g.,
nuisance, emotional harms, trespass, and tax exemption attacks).
166
Defamation is by far the most commonly utilized tort, though several
filers utilize the "shotgun pleading" approach, alleging numerous cate-
gories of tortious behavior. 1
67
A. The Viable SLAPP Lawsuit Model
The indicium of a SLAPP suit is that it is brought in response to a
communication made to a governmental body concerning a substantive
issue of some public interest or concern. This characterization is based
on the legislative history of the anti-SLAPP statutes, focusing on the
floor debates.
168
In characterizing a lawsuit as a SLAPP, the first step is to under-
stand the scope of, and limitations to, the right to petition guaranteed by
the Constitution. Very few precedents directly address the right to peti-
tion; however, generally, it refers to "[t]he right of the people to inform
their representatives in government of their desires with respect to the
passage or enforcement of laws . ,,169 The earliest American codifi-
cation of the right is contained in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of
1642, which restricts protection in four ways. 170 The activity must be
relevant to a proper public question, the subject matter of which is
within the jurisdiction of the body to whom the petition is addressed,
submitted at a convenient time, and in an orderly and respectful man-
ner.17  Elucidating on this concept, James Madison noted that "[t]he
people may . . . publicly address their representatives, may privately
advise them, or declare their sentiment by petition to the whole body; in
all these ways they may communicate their will.' 72 Though the state-
ments were protected even if made maliciously or were false, 17 3 it is
165. See id. at 217.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., Civil Practice, supra note 148.
169. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139
(1961).
170. See Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging . . . ": An Analysis of the
Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CN. L. Rnv. 1153, 1181 (1986).
171. See id.
172. Id. at 1182 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (1789)).
173. See id. at 1183.
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clear that the protection was intended to extend only to communications
proffered to a governmental body, or agent thereof, and concerned a
public issue.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to petition is not absolute
and is not available to protect otherwise libelous communications dis-
guised as petitioning activity.1 74 Two cases, widely cited by SLAPP
participants, articulate what has come to be known as the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine. Noerr, the first case to come before the Court,
involved allegations that the railroads publicly advertised against dereg-
ulation of the trucking industry. The Court held that since the railroads'
activity was "directed toward obtaining governmental action, its legality
was not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose."'' 75  Subse-
quently, in United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, the Court
reiterated that "Noerr shields ... a concerted effort to influence public
officials regardless of intent of purpose." '176 The Noerr-Pennington
doctrine has been interpreted as protecting the right to petition the
courts. 17 7 Although the best defense when moving to dismiss a SLAPP
suit is for the target to assert his right to petition, ironically, this same
assertion is available to the filer, as the right to petition the courts is
correlatively protected.
In contrast to Noerr and Pennington, the Supreme Court overturned
a decision of the National Labor Relations Board that found a restaurant
seeking damages from a waitress who had organized a boycott against it
was an unfair labor practice. 178 The Court recognized the countervailing
interests of access to the courts, holding that "[t]he filing and prosecu-
tion of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair labor
practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for the plain-
tiff's desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights pro-
tected by the [National Labor Relations] Act," as long as the suit has a
reasonable basis in law and fact.
17 9
In McDonald v. Smith, the Court emphasized that the right to peti-
tion does not offer an absolute privilege to one who defames; therefore,
known falsity or reckless disregard for the truth applies equally to the
contents of petitions as to the freedoms of speech and of the press.'
80
The Court has emphatically stated that:
174. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
175. Id. at 140.
176. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
177. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
178. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 461 U.S. 731
(1983).
179. Id. at 743.
180. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985).
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Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which "are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity . . . ,,181
Preparation and transmission of a communication to the govern-
ment are essential elements of petitioning.18 2 But, when the communi-
cation exceeds that which is necessary for petitioning, it must be
subjected to other applicable constitutional guarantees, such as the right
to free speech. 18 3 As deduced from the Court's exposition of the right,
the petition clause is meant to provide the maximum protection of a
citizen's right to petition government where such a right is exercised in
relation to issues of interest to a substantial part of the community."'
Where the parties are litigating matters pertaining to a purely private
interest, not based on matters of public concern, the policies underlying
the petition clause are not implicated; instead, ordinary principles of pro-
cedural and substantive law apply.'
85
In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,186 the
Supreme Court addressed the petition clause, holding that petitioning
activities are immune from liability if they are genuinely aimed at pro-
curing favorable government action, thereby providing a powerful shield
for SLAPP targets.1 87 The Court pointed out that sham petitioning, on
the other hand, in which the government process is used to injure an
opponent, falls outside the petition clause's protection. 88
The prototypical SLAPP suit is one in which a large land developer
files a claim against environmental activists or neighborhood associa-
tions intending to chill their political or legal opposition to the filer's
plans.189 The filer's purpose is to gain an economic advantage over its
target, rather than "to vindicate a legally cognizable right ... ."19o
An example of the factual scenario of such a case was previously
set forth above. 91 In that case, the Rhode Island statute, passed in 1994,
181. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
182. See Smith, supra note 170, at 1189.
183. See id. at 1190.
184. See Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 1121 (Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted).
185. See Civil Practice, supra note 148.
186. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
187. See id. at 379-84.
188. See id. at 380.
189. See Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 815 (Ct. App. 1994).
190. Id. at 816.
191. See supra Section I.A.
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was applied retroactively to a case originally filed in 1992.192 To recap
those facts, Hometown Properties, the owner of a landfill in a commu-
nity in which the defendant, Nancy Hsu Fleming, was a resident, sued
Fleming, alleging defamation and tortious interference with contractual
relations. 193 The allegations were based on statements made by Fleming
to the director of the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Man-
agement and to state legislators in connection with groundwater contam-
ination allegedly caused by the landfill. 194 Fleming was an active
participant in assisting Department officials, who were drafting a set of
proposed groundwater classification regulations. 
195
Hometown, desiring to continue its landfill practices unrestrained,
demanded that Fleming retract her comments, threatening to sue if she
did not. 196 Fleming made no retraction and Hometown's ominous threat
became a reality that dogged her from December of 1992 until June of
1996, when the Rhode Island Supreme Court "directed" the Washington
County Superior Court to grant Fleming's motion for summary judg-
ment pursuant to the state's anti-SLAPP provisions.
197
In its opinion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court carefully scruti-
nized the applicability of the statute, rejecting the lower court's conten-
tion that Fleming had not "demonstrated that she [fell] within the class
of defendants defined" therein.198 The court also rejected Hometown's
contention that the statute was unconstitutional.' 99 In so rejecting, the
court made a section-by-section analysis of the law, ultimately deciding
that Fleming's petitioning of government was not a sham, as clarified by
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, 2" noting that Fleming had been invited
to participate in the environmental evaluation process by the
Department.2°'
The Rhode Island Supreme Court discounted Hometown's con-
clusory allegations that Fleming had engaged in tortious conduct.20 2 It
concluded that the detailed facts contained in the affidavits submitted by
Fleming in support of her motion were substantial, requiring Hometown
to challenge them with direct evidence.20 3 Since Hometown relied
192. See Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56, 59 (R.I. 1996).
193. See id. at 58.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 59.
197. See id. at 59, 64.
198. Id. at 63.
199. See id. at 60.
200. See id. at 60-63.
201. See id. at 59.
202. See id. at 63-64.
203. See id. at 64.
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solely on the assertions contained in its pleadings, the court found
Hometown's opposition insufficient to overcome Fleming's motion and
evidentiary support.2" To reiterate the "independence and individual-
ism" that the settlers sought to ensure to a free community, Justice
Lederberg, writing for the court, recited the Latin phrase inscribed on
the statehouse dome which, translated, states: "Rare felicity of the times
when it is permitted to think what you wish and to say what you
think. '
20 5
B. The Right of Access to Courts of Law
Some SLAPP filers claim that the laws infringe on their constitu-
tional right to a jury trial, or that the laws are used to dismiss valid
defamation claims involving matters devoid of activity associated with
governmental participation.2 °6 Balancing the competing interests of the
First Amendment right to petition government for redress of grievances
and assuring ready access to courts has proven to be problematic.2 °7
The anti-SLAPP laws do not seem to address this problem; instead, they
are deliberately vague and narrowly drawn in order to withstand judicial
review.208 This legislative drafting technique has afforded targets
favorable rulings in a majority of the reported cases. However, it is
difficult to predict how courts will rule, because looking at the decisions
en masse reveals very little consistency among the jurisdictions-even
among different districts within the same state, purportedly applying the
same statute.
The right of access to courts and the right to petition the govern-
ment for redress of grievances spring from the First Amendment's free
speech and right-to-petition clauses. 209 However, the right of access to
courts is actually a discrete fundamental right, derived from various con-
stitutional sources. In part, it derives from the due process clause, 2 10 and
204. See id.
205. See id. at 64 & n.2.
206. See William P. Bethke, Cole v. Lehmann: Practical Reflections on a Teacher Slander Suit
Against Parents, in SLAPPs: STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
GovFRNmFmrr, C935 ALI-ABA 85, *106, *109 (1994).
207. When the New Hampshire Legislature was contemplating passage of an anti-SLAPP
statute, it asked the New Hampshire Supreme Court to review the bill and opine as to its
constitutionality. The justices unanimously decided the law would "imperil[ ] constitutional
rights," because "[a solution cannot strengthen the constitutional rights of one group of citizens
by infringing upon the rights of another group." Opinion of the Justices (SLAPP Suit Procedure),
641 A.2d 1012, 1015 (N.H. 1994).
208. See Judith Miller, States Have Moved to Keep Plaintiffs from Using Courts to Muzzle
Critics, N.Y. TumEs, June 11, 1996, at A22.
209. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978).
210. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974).
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the privileges and immunities clause,2 ' as well as from the First
Amendment itself.
2 12
Access to courts is a substantive rather than procedural right, and
though its exercise can be shaped and guided by the states," 3 it cannot
be obstructed thereby, regardless of the procedural means applied.214
Thus, in fashioning a remedy to stem the flow of frivolous or pretextual
actions, courts must take great care not to unduly impair a litigant's con-
stitutional right of access to the courts.21 5
Professors Pring and Canan acknowledge that a "seeming paradox
of the Right to Petition is that we recognize litigation as one of the pro-
tected ways one can effectively petition government. , 6 Therefore,
when a court abrogates the right of an assertedly aggrieved party to seek
court access for redress of a grievance, it, in effect, validates the very
behavior that it is simultaneously invalidating on the part of the target.
C. Abuse of Statutory Remedies and Judicial Acquiescence
When the challenged activity involves formal testimony in a public
forum concerning a matter of opinion or is a good faith assertion of fact,
the protection afforded should be more absolute and certain, regardless
of the context of the testimony.21 7 However, statements made outside
such fora that are knowingly false and defamatory should not be granted
absolute First Amendment protection.21 8 Of course, SLAPP filers may
have valid concerns, because sometimes, in the course of heated public
hearings, opponents of a project tend to make some pretty outrageous
statements which arguably should not be privileged.219
One of the most flagrant abuses of California's anti-SLAPP legisla-
tion is illustrated in a recent decision entered by the Superior Court for
Santa Clara County.22° The case involved an outspoken attorney, Paul
Wotman, who is "reputedly the owner of the fastest fax in the West.
22 1
In 1991, Wotman, a gay rights advocate with a passion for involving the
211. See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
212. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
213. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977).
214. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).
215. See In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126,
1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc) ("It is axiomatic that no petitioner or person shall ever be denied
his right to the processes of the court.").
216. Pring & Canan, supra note 9, at *7.
217. Bethke, supra note 206, at *105.
218. See id.
219. See Lowe, supra note 24, at 50.
220. See Huff v. Kiley, Case No. 722067 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 10, 1992) (unpublished
decision) (on file with author).
221. Reynolds Holding, A Few Small Steps for the Media, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 1996, at 5/
ZI.
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press in his litigation strategy, filed a suit on behalf of a gay man who
had been attacked by his young neighbor.222 Wotman and his client
publicized the suit by appearing on a variety of tabloid talk shows. The
parents of the young neighbor, who were being sued by Wotman's client
for civil damages in connection with the assault, filed a defamation suit
against Wotman and his client for portraying them as virulently anti-gay
homophobes.223
When the trial court rejected Wotman's argument that the com-
ments were protected because they were part of the initial lawsuit, he
defaulted to another position: The lawsuit was a SLAPP, and the plain-
tiffs were just trying to make trouble for him and keep him from telling
the public about gay bashing. The judge found this argument marginally
persuasive and "reluctantly granted" Wotman's motion to dismiss the
complaint. 224  The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court's ruling.225
This case illustrates the danger of broadly interpreting the protec-
tive statutes. Wotman was surely not addressing a governmental forum
nor seeking action to effectuate a change in the law. Laws criminalizing
such activity as that committed against his client already exist. In 1990,
Congress enacted legislation specifically designed to encourage states to
punish perpetrators of hate crimes.226
Although Wotman and his client surely had a right to speak out
about this issue of public importance and to creatively invoke the anti-
SLAPP statute, it was inappropriate for the court to characterize this
action as a SLAPP.227 As long as there is a recognized right to preserve
a person's reputation, there is a legitimate role for defamation claims.
Therefore, public participation in government should not shield persons
who act in reckless disregard of the truth in defaming others.2 28 Look-
222. See id.
223. See Huff v. Kiley, supra note 220, Second Amended Complaint at 3; see also Huff v.
Kiley, Case No. H013637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), Appellants' Opening Brief at 3-5 (on file with
author).
224. See Huff v. Kiley, supra note 220, Order dated Jan. 7, 1994 (on file with author).
225. See Holding, supra note 221.
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994). California enacted anti-hate crime legislation, codified at
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 422.6-422.95 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997). The California law specifically
includes "sexual orientation" as a class for which protection is granted. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 422.6(a).
227. It is interesting to note that the special motion to dismiss was granted only as to Wotman,
while the case against Kiley was allowed to proceed. Also, the Huffs were awarded attorneys'
fees upon finding that Kiley's motion was frivolous. See Huff v. Kiley, supra note 220, Minute
Order on Motion for Attorney Fees (on file with author). However, the Huffs were not as lucky as
to Wotman; attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $81,840.50 were assessed against them.
See id., Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs (on file with author).
228. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that freedom of
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ing at the matter in a vacuum, one can easily find justification in the
ability of sensational lies meant to gain media play while ruining indi-
vidual careers and lives. If the anti-SLAPP laws are too broadly inter-
preted, the torts of malicious prosecution and defamation will be
virtually eliminated.229
In other venues, Chrysler Corporation sued lawyers and law firms
who enjoyed lucrative business by bringing products liability class
actions against the automobile manufacturer. In one suit, Chrysler sued
two lawyers and their firm in the Eastern District of Missouri for filing a
baseless claim.230 The two St. Louis lawyers had allegedly represented
Chrysler when they worked for another law firm. 3  The company con-
tended that the duo, in using confidential information about the company
obtained in the course of prior representation, committed malpractice.232
Chrysler's complaint contained counts for malpractice,233 breach of
confidentiality,2 34 breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud, 35
breach of contract,236 and tampering with computer data.237 The defend-
ants countersued for abuse of process and defamation.238 They con-
tended that the work done for Chrysler was totally unrelated to the issues
raised in the class actions.239 The lawyers claimed the actions by
Chrysler were part of a "terrorism campaign.., designed to chill and
intimidate lawyers from filing legitimate claims. ' 240 They also alleged
that Chrysler's actions were a "'publicity stunt' aimed at drumming up
support for a tort reform bill in Congress. 241
In addition to the Missouri action, Chrysler filed a motion for sanc-
tions against three Seattle attorneys and their firm in a Washington fed-
eral suit in which Chrysler was a defendant.24 2 In that case, Chrysler
the press does not extend to knowing or reckless disregard of the truth which defames a public
official).
229. See Bethke, supra note 206, at *106.
230. See Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, Case No. 4:96CV591CDP (E.D. Mo. filed Mar. 26, 1996)
(pleadings on file with author).
231. See id., Complaint at 3.
232. See id. at 7.
233. See id. at 6.
234. See id. at 7.
235. See id. at 8.
236. See id. at 12.
237. See id. at 11.
238. See id., Counterclaim at 6, 11.
239. See id. See also Defendants' Joint Answer to Chrysler Corporation's First Complaint at
1-2.
240. Id., Counterclaim at 5.
241. Mark Hansen, A Drive to Stifle Litigation: Chrysler Tries to Slam Door on Class Actions
It Calls Frivolous With a Lawsuit and a Request for Sanctions, 82 A.B.A. J. 22 (June 1996).
242. See Cowden v. Chrysler Corp., Case No. 951710WD (W.D. Wash. filed Nov. 3, 1995)
(Motion for Sanctions filed Mar. 25, 1996) (on file with author).
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moved for sanctions against opposing counsel, alleging that the basis for
the class action they had filed was invented, and that the named plaintiff
had not authorized the filing of the claim. Specifically, Chrysler
asserted that the lawyers filed the class action without having been
retained by the plaintiff named therein.243 Chrysler sought to recover
the costs it incurred in defending the class action,2" which was subse-
quently dismissed.245
Even Professor Pring, who has extensively studied the SLAPP phe-
nomenon, considers the use of the anti-SLAPP arguments by Chrysler's
opposition in these contexts inappropriate, as no governmental petition-
ing was involved. He reiterated that "[s]uch suits often are filed by
developers who claim that groups opposing their building plans defamed
them. '24 6  Rather than SLAPPs, Professor Pring would classify the
Chrysler actions as "strategic lawsuits against future lawsuits. 247
Whatever they are, they are not SLAPPs.248
IV. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND STATUTORY REMEDIES
FOR VIOLATORS
There is a First Amendment right to petition a court by filing a
lawsuit, the frivolous exercise of which right can invoke sanctions. 24 9
There are other more appropriate and feasible ways of controlling the
intimidation inherent in the practice of law than by filing suit to preempt
future litigation.2 10 The substantive moral content of law seeks to pro-
mote both cooperation and advocacy.251
Several avenues are available to penalize attorneys for infractions
of the rules requiring that only meritorious claims be advanced. These
243. See id., Chrysler's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Sanctions at 2.
244. See id., Chrysler's Motion for Sanctions at 1.
245. See id., Plaintiffs' Opposition to Chrysler's Motion for Sanctions at 20.
246. See Hansen, supra note 241.
247. Id.
248. Missouri does not have anti-SLAPP legislation; therefore, no such claim was specifically
implicated in the Carey case. Conversely, Washington does have such legislation, but it is
interesting to note that the statute was not expressly invoked in Cowden. At the time of this
publication, the Missouri case was yet unresolved, although trial is currently scheduled to
commence March 2, 1998 before the Honorable Catherine D. Perry. Chrysler's motion for
sanctions was denied in the Washington case and, by mandate issued by the Ninth Circuit on July
17, 1997, the lower court's decision was affirmed. However, the importance of these cases is to
illustrate the lengths to which SLAPP tactics are implied, as the news articles in which they were
reported concern the SLAPP issue, thereby recognizing the connection. These cases, though not
later discussed herein, should be recalled when reviewing the feasibility of a federal solution. See
discussion infra Section V.
249. See Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 208 (10th Cir. 1981).
250. See Richard 0. Brooks, Les Mains Sales: The Ethical and Political Implications of
SLAPP Suits, 7 PACE ENVmL. L. REv. 61, 62-63 (1989).
251. See id. at 69-70.
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remedial measures include Rule 11 sanctions,2 5 2 statutory penalties for
attorneys who "unreasonably and vexatiously" multiply litigation,253 and
the inherent power of the courts to impose sanctions on lawyers who act
in bad faith to abuse the judicial process.254
A. SLAPP-Backs
Several of the anti-SLAPP laws provide a prevailing target with a
cause of action against the filer. Such suits, called SLAPP-backs, are
generally brought in state courts on the basis of malicious prosecution or
abuse of process, or in federal courts for civil rights violations. They
generally allow recovery of compensatory damages, and sometimes per-
mit awards of punitive damages.255
The SLAPP-back has become the latest legal growth industry in the
SLAPP area.2 56  As formerly noted, these suits are filed by targets
against the original filers for abuse of the courts and violating the
targets' First Amendment rights.2 57 Professors Pring and Canan con-
demn SLAPPs for posing a danger to already overburdened court sys-
tems.258 However, with the new SLAPP-back legislation, this danger is
multiplied.259
Some question the efficacy of sanctions in deterring SLAPP
suits.2 60 This skepticism is based on the fact that since the statutes pro-
vide for a stay of proceedings pending a quick resolution, recovery of
attorneys' fees will generally be modest; thus, there is no real disincen-
tive to the SLAPP filer.26 1 In addition, a filer may argue that sanctions
should not be imposed because such a threat would chill his right to
petition the government-in the form of petitioning the court for
redress.
252. See FED. R. Crv. P. 1 (c). The most relevant provision of the Rule as it relates to SLAPP
suits is the certification that it is not being filed for any improper purpose. See id. Rule 1 l(b)(1).
253. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994).
254. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980).
255. See McMurry & Pierce, supra note 111, at *831.
256. See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, SLAPP-Happy Companies, N.Y. TimEs, Mar.
29, 1996, at A21.
257. See id.
258. See Benson & Merriam, supra note 82, at *841.
259. See id. at *845.
260. See Mark A. Chertok, Sanctions as a SLAPP Deterrent: How Effective Are They?, in
SLAPPs: STRATEGIC LAwsurrs AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN GovERNMENT, C935 ALI-
ABA 117, *120-21 (1994).
261. See id. at *120.
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B. Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Model Rules of
Professional Conduct
Principles of professional responsibility dictate that an attorney's
job is to zealously defend the client's rights. A lawyer is ethically pro-
hibited from "fil[ing] a suit, assert[ing] a position, conduct[ing] a
defense, delay[ing] a trial, or tak[ing] other action on behalf of his client
when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another. '262
Moreover, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct relieve an
attorney from liability for filing a meritorious claim, which is one based
on "a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. '263 A meritorious claim is one that it is grounded in "good
faith. ' '26 "Good faith," however, is subjective; therefore, it is whatever
the lawyer believes it is.265 An attorney, in representing his client, may
genuinely, but mistakenly, believe that a right is being infringed upon or
property is being "taken. 2 66
C. Federal and State Mandates Precluding Frivolous Suits
It is well established that "Rule 11 sanctions are designed to dis-
courage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation
process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses. '267 The major goals
of Rule 11 sanctions are to rid courts of meritless litigation while reduc-
ing the increasing costs of civil litigation. These goals are achieved by
penalizing lawyers, and/or their clients, who abuse the litigation pro-
cess. 268 A pleading, motion or other paper found to be in contravention
of Rule 11 subjects the signing attorney and/or the responsible party to
appropriate sanctions.
2 69
Pursuant to Rule 11, a lawyer who signs and files a pleading,
motion, or other paper in federal court without first conducting an
inquiry to ensure that it is well grounded in fact and law, or who files a
paper for an improper purpose, may be sanctioned, monetarily or other-
wise. 2 7 0 The Supreme Court clearly stated that "the central purpose ofRule 11 is to deter baseless filings .... Although the Rule must be read
262. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1983).
263. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.1 (1996).
264. See id.
265. See Brooks, supra note 250, at 67.
266. See id. at 67-68.
267. Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
268. See id. at 1559.
269. See Collins v. Walden, 834 F.2d 961, 966 (11th Cir. 1987).
270. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(2).
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in light of concerns that it will spawn satellite litigation and chill vigor-
ous advocacy, any interpretation must give effect to the Rule's central
goal of deterrence."27
Since Rule 11 is designed as a deterrent, it allows courts to exercise
discretion in devising sanctions to achieve this goal.272 In making this
assessment, courts may consider "what amount, given the financial
resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from
repetition in the same case," as well as "what amount is needed to deter
similar activity by other litigants ... ,"273 The rule does not preclude a
later action for malicious prosecution against the offender.274
Rule 11 permits courts to impose appropriate sanctions on the filing
attorney, the represented party, or both.275 Often, only the lawyer is
sanctioned. This may be in recognition of the lawyer's ethical duty not
to prosecute frivolous claims, or it may reflect the view that the lawyer
bears responsibility for having the case entrusted to him.276 However,
the rule is silent as to whether the law firm, or merely the attorney who
signed the offending filing, should be sanctioned. The Supreme Court
demystified this ambiguity, holding that the rule imposes a personal,
non-delegable duty on the signers of papers; thus, only those who actu-
ally sign the offending papers are subjected to sanctions.27 7
Levying sanctions against a signing attorney potentially effects the
greatest deterrence against filing baseless and harassing claims.278 How-
ever, the deterrence value of such sanctions can only be realized upon
assurance that the attorney or firm actually pays the sanction imposed.
Otherwise, the sanctions will be just another cost of doing business for
the filer.279
Most states have rules or statutes that are commensurate with Rule
11 sanctioning. These states include those in which anti-SLAPP legisla-
tion has been enacted.28 °
271. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (citation omitted).
272. See Chertok, supra note 260, at *121.
273. FED. R. Cirv. P. 11 (b) and (c), Advisory Comm. Notes.
274. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (d), Advisory Comm. Notes.
275. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) & Advisory Comm. Notes.
276. See Slane v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 115 F.R.D. 61, 63 (D. Colo. 1987).
277. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126-27 (1989).
278. See Chertok, supra note 260, at *151. Although Rule 11 sanctions may be allocated
between attorney and client, "[t]he attorney and his client do not stand as equals before the court.
Sanctions are imposed against the client purely for their deterrent effect. But sanctions are
imposed against the attorney also for disciplinary purposes .. " Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City
of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (emphasis added), modified, 821 F.2d 121
(2d Cir. 1987).
279. See Chertok, supra note 260, at * 152.
280. See CAL. Crv. PRAC. CODE § 128.5 (West Supp. 1997); DEL. SUPER. CT. Clv. R. 11; GA.
CODE 9-15-14 (Supp. 1997); ME. R. Civ. P. 11; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 6F (West 1985
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In addition to Rule 11, Congress enacted a federal statute designed
to punish lawyers whose groundless litigation techniques waste time and
cost their opponents money by unnecessarily prolonging litigation.28'
Specifically, the statute provides that any attorney "who so multiplies
the proceedings... unreasonably or vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.-
28 2
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that along with the pow-
ers derived from statutes and court rules, federal courts have the inherent
power to control the proceedings before them, which includes the power
to impose sanctions on parties and their lawyers for abusing the judicial
process. 283 However, the Court cautioned that this power must be exer-
cised with great restraint, and requires a sanctioning court to specify on
the record the manner in which the offender acted in bad faith and give
the offender notice and an opportunity to be heard.284
In sum, "[t]he duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal
system are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds
of the law. ' 285 Being truthful to a client and to the court may not always
be easy, but it is necessary to maintain a lawyer's duty to the profes-
286sion. An attorney should truthfully discuss matters with his client,
including the fact that the case is weak or that a less-than-honest position
is being asserted. 287 Abuse of the legal process occurs on both sides of
any issue involving political posturing. To signify as privileged all
issues that involve political premises is to ignore the fact that many
political actions have traditionally traversed through legal channels. A
primary example is the civil rights movement, which took political
actions and translated them into court actions.288 That is not to say that
SLAPPs are ethically correct; the problem is that the filers appear to be
on the wrong side of the issue.2 9 Though both the filers and targets
may come to court with "unclean hands," those of the filers seem less
clean, and thus, unworthy of judicial sympathy. However, they are no
& Supp. 1997); MAss. R. Civ. P. 11(a); MIN. R. Cirv. P. 11; NEB. R. Civ. P. 25-824; NEV. CT.
RULES ANN. R. 11; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 130-1.1 (Consol. Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-29-21
(Supp. 1996); WASH. SUPER. CT. R. 11.
281. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994).
282. Id. (emphasis added).
283. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980).
284. See id. at 767.
285. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1983).
286. See Karen 0. Bowdre, Law Practice: A Place for Moral Values, 57 ALA. LAW. 158, 161
(May 1996).
287. See id.




less worthy of due process protection.2 9 °
V. FEASIBILITY OF A FEDERAL SOLUTION
Some members of the legal community are skeptical about the pos-
sibility of ensuring "absolute" free expression, and are unpersuaded that
categories that would trigger the anti-SLAPP laws can be precisely
defined to guarantee absolutely free expression.29' Critics of anti-
SLAPP laws profess that they prohibit liability for knowing, reckless or
negligent falsehoods uttered in public arenas that are calculated to influ-
ence govermment decisions.292 When construed in this manner, courts
dismiss claims of defamation irrespective of whether the participant has
lied about the factual evidence upon which his "petition" is based.293
In McDonald v. Smith, the Court rebuked a private citizen's First
Amendment attempt to defame a potential U.S. attorney with impu-
nity. 29 4 The Court held that the petition clause does not grant an abso-
lute immunity for defamatory remarks, even if they are made in the
course of seeking governmental action.295
A plaintiff seeking damages for defamation under McDonald still
has the burden of proving that the offensive statements were made with
actual malice, pursuant to the holding in New York Times v. Sullivan.2 96
This poses the problem of how to prove actual malice when the maker of
the statements is not a public figure, because ten years later, in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,2 9 7 the Court ruled that the Sullivan standard does not
apply to private individuals, even when the statements address matters
of public concern.298
In Gertz, the Court reiterated its position taken in prior rulings:
[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's
interest in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public
issues. They belong to that category of utterances which "are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
290. See id.
291. See Bethke, supra note 206, at *104-05.
292. See Bruce Fein, Debasing Debate Under Green Cover, WASH. TIEs, Sept. 4, 1996, at
A15.
293. See id.
294. 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).
295. See id.
296. 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964).
297. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
298. See id. at 352.
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morality."2
More recently, in the oft-cited case of Protect Our Mountain Envi-
ronment, Inc. v. District Court (hereinafter POME),3° the Colorado
Supreme Court adopted a new rule and a heightened standard for accom-
modating litigants' competing concerns.3°' While granting great defer-
ence to a defendant's petitioning activities, the court imposed an
extreme burden of proof on a filer alleging abuse of administrative or
judicial processes of government. This standard requires the filer, in
response to a special motion to dismiss, to
[M]ake a sufficient showing to permit the court to reasonably con-
clude that the defendant's petitioning activities were not immunized
from liability under the First Amendment because: (1) the defend-
ant's administrative or judicial claims were devoid of reasonable fac-
tual support, or, if so supportable, lacked any cognizable basis in law
for their assertion; and (2) the primary purpose of the defendant's
petitioning activity was to harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some
other improper objective; and (3) the defendant's petitioning activity
had the capacity to adversely affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.
3 2
This test was designed to "safeguard the constitutional right of citi-
zens to utilize the administrative and judicial processes for redress of
legal grievances without fear of retaliatory litigation and, at the same
time, will permit those truly aggrieved by abuse of these processes to
vindicate their own legal rights. 3 °3 The court permitted those partici-
pating in public debates significant leeway by allowing erroneous or
even defamatory statements to be made as long as they raise issues of
public interest and concern.3°4
Malice is easy to allege but difficult to prove, absent the discovery
which the anti-SLAPP laws deny. 305 Thus, in distinguishing between a
legitimate claim for defamation and one violative of a First Amendment
right, the rational approach would be to distinguish between "petition-
ing" and "speech. 30 6 The most practical approach for making such a
distinction would be to evaluate the body to whom the communication is
addressed.30 7 However, indifference to intent, as held in POME, should
not be the standard, because that would merely encourage the most
299. Id. at 340 (citations omitted).
300. 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) (en banc).
301. See id. at 1368-69.
302. Id. at 1369.
303. Id.
304. See id.
305. See Lowe, supra note 24, at 51.




deliberate and malicious defamatory statements to be cast in "petition"
form.
The ideal anti-SLAPP law would "[c]over all communications to
government regardless of form; ... [c]over all government agencies and
agents; . . . [s]end a clear, unambiguous signal warning against filing
SLAPPs; and . . . [s]et up an effective, fair, early review for filed
SLAPPs."3 °8 However, contrary to the holding of Omni Outdoor Adver-
tising, the protection afforded should be dependent on whether the citi-
zens' input was right or wrong, wise or foolish, well-intentioned or
mean-spirited. 3" As Justice Powell emphasized in Gertz, falsehoods do
not constructively contribute to debate in a community designed to be
governed by reason.31 ° When a citizen resorts to defamatory falsehoods,
all constitutional protections lapse in order to further rational discourse
of public affairs. Our democracy cannot be grounded on lies to govern-
ment in an effort to influence public policy. "If a nation expects to be
ignorant and free .... it expects what never was and never will be. 3 1
Assuming a need for uniform legislation, Professors Pring and
Canan have drafted a proposed model anti-SLAPP bill which incorpo-
rates these ideals. 312 They believe that a federal bill, fashioned after
their proposed model bill, is necessary to ensure uniform decisions
among the various jurisdictions. Thus far, the lack of uniformity among
the various anti-SLAPP laws has resulted in conflicting interpretations
and resolutions.31 3
The problem with such a proposal is that the underlying causes of
action set forth in SLAPPs are based on state tort claims. A federal
court is compelled to address the issues as presented in a well-pled com-
plaint,314 and apply state law thereto.315 Although tort elements do not
materially differ among the states, courts have not been harmonious in
their application, resulting in discordant holdings.3 t6
Defamation is a recurrent tort alleged in SLAPPs. Establishing the
defamatory character of a statement generally requires proof that the
maker intended to harm the plaintiff s reputation in the community or to
deter others from associating or dealing with the plaintiff.3"7 The
308. Pring & Canan, supra note 9, at *21-22.
309. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1991).
310. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
311. Fein, supra note 292 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
312. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 6, at 201-05.
313. See id. at 190.
314. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
315. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
316. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 773
(5th ed. 1984).
317. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1989).
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Restatement identifies various causes of action for defamation, which
require proof of different, although similar, elements. The actions are
delineated by the status of the plaintiff and the right or property affected
by the defamation.
The basic elements of a defamation claim are the unprivileged pub-
lication to a third party of a false and defamatory statement concerning
another which amounts, at least, to negligence on the part of the pub-
lisher, and causes special harm to the plaintiff. 18 The defamation can
relate to a private person319 or to a corporation.32° Though a corporation
has no reputation in a personal sense,32' it can maintain an action for
defamation for statements that tend to discredit it or cause it business
losses, without proof of special harm, 32 2 as is required for tortious inter-
ference with contractual or business relations 323 and disparagement of
property.324 Proof of pecuniary loss is not required where the defama-
tion is actionable per se.325
The court must make the initial determination, as a matter of law,
whether a statement is capable of a particular meaning and whether that
meaning is defamatory.326 Once this determination is made, the jury
determines whether this defamatory meaning was understood by its
recipient.327 In performing their respective functions, the court and jury
are to consider the circumstances surrounding the communication, with
context being an important factor in the analysis.
328
The Restatement also recognizes two types of privileges that attach
to certain activities and statements that would otherwise be actionable in
the absence of the privilege. An absolute privilege generally applies
where the allegedly defamatory statement was made in the course of
executive, legislative or judicial proceedings. 329 Alternatively, a defend-
ant may enjoy a conditional, or qualified, privilege, which takes into
account the appropriateness of the occasion on which the defamatory
statement was published, the legitimacy of the interest which the pub-
lisher sought to promote or protect, and the appropriateness of the per-
318. See id. § 558.
319. See id. § 580B.
320. See id. § 561.
321. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 316, § 111, at 779.
322. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561 cmt. b (1989).
323. See id. § 766.
324. See id. § 624.
325. See id. § 569; see also id. § 569 cmt. b for the definition of what is actionable per se in
defamation suits.
326. See id. § 614(1).
327. See id. § 614(2).
328. See id. § 614 cmt. d.
329. See id. §§ 585-591.
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sons to whom the statement was published.330
A plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to overcome a qualified privi-
lege by showing that the privilege was abused. 3 3 1 Abuse of privilege
may be established in one of three ways: by showing that the defendant
published the defamatory statement with actual knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity; by showing that
the defendant published the defamatory statement for an improper pur-
pose; or by showing that the publication was made to persons or con-
tained defamatory elements which were not necessary to serve'the
purpose of the privilege.332 Evidence of hostility, ill-will or conflict
between the plaintiff and defendant may give rise to an inference that the
defendant made the defamatory statement for an improper purpose.333
Whether a privilege exists is a question of law for a court to decide
in the first instance.334 If the facts giving rise to an asserted privilege are
in dispute, the jury must determine whether the defendant acted for an
improper purpose and thereby abused the privilege.
335
Another common tort basis for suits labelled as SLAPPs is inten-
tional interference with business or contractual relations. 336 A defendant
may be held liable for intentionally or improperly interfering with the
plaintiffs rights under a contract with a third party if the interference
causes the plaintiff a pecuniary loss. 3 37 Whether the interference is
improper is determined by considering, among other things, the actor's
motive.338 Thus, the basis of liability for this tort is intent.339
As evidenced by the elements required to establish defamation and
interference with business relations, the defendant's state of mind is an
integral issue in determining both the existence of tort liability and the
absence of an asserted privilege. Because intent is a material element of
these torts and the defense of privilege, trial, rather than summary dis-
missal,3' ° as provided by the anti-Slapp legislation, is required. Prior to
determining the parties' intent, a reasonable fact finder must hear all the
330. See id. § 595; see also Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 520 A.2d 1154, 1170 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987).
331. See, e.g., Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Mass. 1978).
332. See Bainhauer, 520 A.2d at 1172-73.
333. See Slaughter v. Friedman, 649 P.2d 886, 890 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (finding that
allegations that the defendants knew their statements were false and made them out of ill-will
arising out of previous quarrels and rivalries with the plaintiff were sufficient to defeat the
privilege claim for purposes of a demurrer).
334. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 619(1) (1989).
335. See id. § 619(2) cmt. b.
336. See id. § 766.
337. See id.
338. See id. § 767.
339. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 316, § 129, at 982.
340. See Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1551, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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evidence, draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, and judge the credi-
bility of the witnesses.341 Conclusory, unsubstantiated statements of a
witness with an interest in the outcome of the case are unreliable and a
jury could find them to be less than candid and unworthy of belief.3" 2 It
is precisely for this reason that a court should hesitate to cavalierly grant
a motion to dismiss without giving the plaintiff a chance to conduct dis-
covery to substantiate a claim that the defendant acted with an improper
purpose or motive. In summarily granting dismissal pursuant to an anti-
SLAPP statute, a court could erroneously preclude a plaintiff from prov-
ing a legitimate assertion that his constitutional rights have been
obstructed.
Several possible solutions to the anomalies stated exist that would
provide a federal cause of action to discourage SLAPPs, but none are
flawless. One such possibility, though not strictly indigenous to SLAPP
suits, is to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require a
heightened pleading standard, as opposed to the current, liberal notice
pleading.343 As currently promulgated, a pleading setting forth a claim
for relief is merely required to include "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief."
'344
Some states already provide such a heightened pleading stan-
dard.345 Contrarily, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
complaint may not be dismissed absent a showing that the plaintiff can-
not prove a set of facts to support a claim upon which relief can be
granted.3"6 Moreover, a plaintiff in a defamation action is not required
to plead, in haec verbis, language alleged to be actionable.347
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure neither mention nor require
that facts be stated in a certain manner, or even included at all.34 8 An
oft-cited opinion authored by Judge Jerome Frank observed that the
imposition of peculiarly stiff requirements in certain actions would
"frustrate the Congressional intent" of the liberal pleading rules.349
Judge Frank also pointed out that if "the defendants, before trial, desire
more detailed information from [a] plaintiff, they can seek it by . . .
341. See id.
342. See id.
343. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
344. Id. Rule 8(a)(2).
345. See, e.g., Levin v. King, 648 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); see also STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL & JONATHAN M. LANDERS, CIVIL PROCEDURE 367-68 (3d ed. 1992) (stating that,
although fewer than half the states still require Code pleading, they include the most populous
states, such as Illinois, California, and New York).
346. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
347. See Stabler v. New York Times Co., 569 F. Supp. 1131, 1138 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
348. See Rannels v. S.E. Nichols, Inc., 591 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1979).
349. See Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., Inc., 141 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1944).
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discovery."3 ' Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court, recognized
the modem practice of "simplicity and reasonable brevity in plead-
ing."35' He emphasized that, "where a bona fide complaint is filed that
charges every element necessary to recover, summary dismissal of a
civil case for failure to set out evidential facts can seldom be
justified. 352
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court decisions, some federal courts
have required plaintiffs bringing defamation claims to set forth the alleg-
edly defamatory words, holding that failure to do so warrants dismissal
on the grounds that the claim is vague and fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.353 Thus, it is evident that even among the
federal jurisdictions, what constitutes sufficient notice to maintain a
cause of action for defamation is unclear.
Further complicating the feasibility of anti-SLAPP legislation on
the federal level is that assertion of a privilege by a defendant is consid-
ered an affirmative defense in a defamation suit.354 Therefore, the asser-
tion of a privilege must be proved as well as pled. Accordingly,
dismissal of a complaint on the ground of privilege before an answer is
filed would be premature.355 This is consistent with the Restatement's
view that the court must first determine whether a privilege exists as
properly pled and proved, and then the trier of fact must decide whether
the privilege was abused.35 6
The incongruity of pleading requirements in defamation as well as
in other tort claims could be resolved by amending the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Such an amendment would still place the onus for
pleading in the first instance upon the plaintiff, as does the anti-SLAPP
legislation. It would also allow courts a better opportunity to determine
the viability of an action and decide whether it should be maintained
beyond the pleading phase or is, instead, pretextual in nature.
Furthermore, some state tort claims require that certain elements be
specifically pled, even in the absence of a procedural rule for heightened
pleading. Such claims fall under the rubric of injurious falsehood,
which encompasses a myriad of labels including slander of title, dispar-
agement of title, trade libel, and interference with a prospective business
350. Id. at 979.
351. United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954).
352. Id.
353. See, e.g., Walters v. Linhof, 559 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (D. Colo. 1983).
354. See Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1951).
355. See id.
356. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 619(1) & cmt. b (1989).
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advantage.357 The elements of an injurious falsehood claim are the pub-
lication or communication of a false statement about the plaintiff, his
property, or his business to a third person, which causes the plaintiff
some pecuniary loss.35  Requiring a plaintiff to plead "special damages"
ensures that such damages are "directly traceable to a defendant's failure
to discharge his contract obligations or such duties as are imposed upon
him by law. 359 Special damages consist of "items of damage which are
peculiar to the case. '36 ° By requiring this heightened pleading standard,
inclusive of pleading actual and computable damage, the risk of having
to defend against a pretextual claim is lessened. This might not be a
feasible solution in circumstances such as those presented in Huff v.
Wotman,3 6 1 however, where the plaintiffs were private citizens not
claiming business losses. Rather, they claimed general damages for loss
of reputation in their community, shame, mortification, and hurt
feelings.362
Another possible avenue for ensuring the viability of a claim is
through presuit screening requirements, currently available in most
states for medical malpractice suits. 363 The purpose of the screening is
to give the defendant notice in order to allow investigation of the matter
and to promote presuit settlement and resolution."6 Such a device could
be utilized in tort claims in which pecuniary loss cannot be substanti-
ated, but where there are non-economic damages such as emotional dis-
tress, requiring an expert opinion corroborating the intangible harm
caused by the defendant's conduct.365 In theory, the plaintiff would be
responsible for expenditures necessary to "discover" its case.
Unless promulgated on a federal level, however, any presuit screen-
ing requirements would not be honored by federal courts even in diver-
sity cases. As long as there is "a direct conflict between the
requirements of [a state statute] and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and those federal rules have been implemented in a constitutional
manner, the [federal] court.., must abide by the procedural rules estab-
357. See William L. Prosser, Injurious Falsehood: The Basis of Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REv.
425, 425 (1959).
358. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 624 (1989).
359. 22 AM. JUR. 2d § 39 (1970).
360. Id.
361. See Huff v. Kiley, Case No. 722067 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 10, 1992) (unpublished
decision) (on file with author).
362. See id., Complaint at 5.
363. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 766.203 (1997).
364. See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Barber, 638 So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla. 1st DCA
1994).
365. Cf FLA. STAT. ch. 766.203(2) (1997).
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lished by Congress. '366 As it currently stands, to institute such a presuit
screening requirement would be in direct contravention of the federal
rules promoting "simplicity" and expediency.367
As foretold, there appears to be no simple solution for ensuring
uniformity in handling suits that are alleged to be SLAPPs. Amending
procedural rules could potentially vitiate any success at a constitutional
remedy because of a possible loss of a substantive right. Therefore, as
previously stated, it seems that the more probable solution would be to
place some burdens on the professional-the attorney-to abide by ethi-
cal standards of practice.368
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has proclaimed that the right to petition con-
ferred by the First Amendment is one of the "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institu-
tions .... -"369 However, it must not be forgotten that a plaintiff in a civil
action possesses the same right to petition as does the defendant. This
right to petition includes the right of access to courts. It is both illogical
and inequitable to grant one right to the exclusion of another.
Rights and duties have corresponding realms of significance. An
absolute right to petition for redress of grievances implies the abso-
lute nonexistence of any right to one's reputation or good name if it is
implicated in something styled a "petition." Thus, reform geared to
protect against SLAPPs necessarily lessens the legal protection for
personal and professional reputation.37°
Although certain statutory safeguards are beneficial in blatant cir-
cumstances, the laws should not be abused by using them as a shortcut
to relieve a defendant of liability for conduct for which he is truly culpa-
ble. Such an abuse could effectively extinguish common law tort claims
brought by a genuinely aggrieved party. In interpreting the laws,
whether statutory or common law, it is up to the courts to construe the
petition clause as originally intended-to protect valid communications
made to a governmental entity for the purpose of effecting action from
that entity. Providing a defendant who has not participated in legitimate
petition activity with immunity would be a farce. It will neither further
the goals that the framers sought to achieve when they drafted the First
366. Braddock v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 580, 584 (M.D. Fla.
1995).
367. See United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954).
368. See discussion supra Section IV.
369. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
370. Bethke, supra note 206, at *105.
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Amendment nor promote open and robust public participation, just as
calling a cat a bird will not make it fly.
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